We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: (i) the central bank has private information about its long-run target for the policy rate; and (ii) the central bank is averse to bond-market volatility. In this setting, discretionary monetary policy is gradualist, or inertial, in the sense that the central bank only adjusts the policy rate slowly in response to changes in its privately-observed target. Such gradualism reflects an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort ends up being thwarted in equilibrium, as long-term rates rationally react more to a given move in short rates when the central bank moves more gradually. The same desire to mitigate bond-market volatility can lead the central bank to lower short rates sharply when publicly-observed term premiums rise. In both cases, there is a time-consistency problem, and society would be better off appointing a central banker who cares less about the bond market. We also discuss the implications of our model for forward guidance once the economy is away from the zero lower bound.
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I. Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on the well-known phenomenon of gradualism in monetary policy. As described by Bernanke (2004) , gradualism is the idea that "the Federal Reserve tends to adjust interest rates incrementally, in a series of small or moderate steps in the same direction." This behavior can be represented empirically by an inertial Taylor rule, with the current level of the federal funds rate modeled as a weighted average of a target rate-which is itself a function of inflation and the output gap as in, e.g., Taylor (1993) -and the lagged value of the funds rate. In this specification, the coefficient on the lagged funds rate captures the degree of inertia in policy. In recent U.S. samples, estimates of the degree of inertia are strikingly high, on the order of 0.85 in quarterly data.
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Several authors have proposed theories in which this kind of gradualism can be thought of as optimal behavior on the part of the central bank. One influential line of thinking, due originally to Brainard (1967) and refined by Sack (1998) , is that moving gradually makes sense when there is uncertainty about how the economy will respond to a change in the stance of policy. An alternative rationale comes from Woodford (2003) , who argues that committing to move gradually gives the central bank more leverage over long-term rates for a given change in short rates, a property which is desirable in the context of his model.
In what follows, we offer a different take on gradualism. In our model, the observed degree of policy inertia is not optimal from an ex ante perspective, but rather reflects a fundamental timeconsistency problem. The distinguishing feature of our approach is that the Fed is assumed to have private information about its preferred value of the target rate. In other words, the Fed knows something about its reaction function that the market does not. Although this assumption is not standard in the literature on monetary policy, it should be emphasized that it is necessary if one wants to address the basic fact that financial markets respond to monetary policy announcements. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide a comprehensive recent empirical treatment; see also Rudebusch (2002 Rudebusch ( , 2006 . Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2015) argue that the degree of inertia in Federal Reserve rate-setting became more pronounced after about 2000. 2 Said differently, if the Fed mechanically followed a policy rule that was a function only of publicly observable variables (e.g., the current values of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate), then the market would react to news releases about movements in these variables but not to Fed policy statements.
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We then enrich the model by adding term premium shocks as a source of publicly observable variation in long-term interest rates. We show that in its efforts to reduce bond-market volatility, the Fed is tempted to try to offset term premium shocks, cutting the policy rate when term premiums rise.
Effectively, the Fed tries to pretend that it has received dovish private information about the optimal target rate whenever there is a positive term premium shock even though the term premium shock is public. Again, this tactic is unsuccessful in reducing volatility in equilibrium. Thus, the presence of term premium shocks exacerbates the Fed's time-consistency problem.
Finally, we extend the model to an explicitly dynamic setting, which allows us to more fully characterize how a given innovation to the Fed's target works its way into the funds rate over time.
These dynamic results enable us to draw a closer link between the mechanism in our model and the empirical evidence on the degree of inertia in the funds rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some motivating evidence, based on readings of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) transcripts. Section III presents the static version of the model and summarizes our basic results on under-adjustment of the policy rate, multiple equilibria, forward guidance, and term premiums. Section IV develops a dynamic extension of the model, and Section V concludes.
II. Motivating Evidence from FOMC Transcripts
In their study of monetary-policy inertia, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) use FOMC transcripts to document two key points. First, FOMC members sometimes speak in a way that is suggestive of a gradual-adjustment model-that is, they articulate a target for the policy rate, and then put forward reasons why it is desirable to adjust only slowly in the direction of that target.
Second, one of the stated rationales for such gradualism appears to be a desire not to create financialmarket instability. Coibion and Gorodnichenko highlight the following quote from Chairman Alan Greenspan at the March 1994 FOMC meeting:
"My own view is that eventually we have to be at 4 to 4½ percent. The question is not whether but when. If we are to move 50 basis points, I think we would create far more instability than we realize, largely because a half-point is not enough to remove the question of where we are ultimately going. I think there is a certain advantage in doing 25 basis points…."
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In a similar spirit, at the August 2004 meeting, shortly after the Fed had begun to raise the funds rate from the low value of one percent that had prevailed since mid-2003, Chairman Greenspan remarked:
"Consequently, the sooner we can get back to neutral, the better positioned we will be. We were required to ease very aggressively to offset the events of 2000 and 2001, and we took the funds rate down to extraordinarily low levels with the thought in the back of our minds, and often said around this table, that we could always reverse our actions. Well, reversing is not all that easy….We've often discussed that ideally we'd like to be in a position where, when we move as we did on June 30 and I hope today, the markets respond with a shrug. What that means is that the adjustment process is gradual and does not create discontinuous problems with respect to balance sheets and asset values."
These sorts of quotes help motivate our basic modeling approach, in which gradualism in monetary policy reflects the Fed's desire to keep bond-market volatility in check-in Greenspan's words, to "not create discontinuous problems with respect to balance sheets and asset values." This same approach may also be helpful in thinking about changes in gradualism over time. Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2015) show that the degree of inertia in Fed rate-setting behavior became significantly more pronounced after about 2000; given the logic of our model, one might wonder whether this heightened inertia was associated with an increase over time in the Fed's concern with financial markets. In a crude attempt to speak to this question, we examine all 200 FOMC transcripts for the 25-year period 1985-2009 , and for each meeting, simply measure the frequency of words related to financial markets. 5 Specifically, we count the number of times the terms "financial market," "equity market," "bond market," "credit market," "fixed income," and "volatility" are mentioned.
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For each year, we aggregate this count and divide by the total number of words in that year's transcripts. Figure 1 displays the results from this exercise. As can be seen, there is a strong upward trend in the data. While there is also a good deal of volatility around the trend-mentions of financialmarket terms decline in the years preceding the financial crisis and then spike up-a simple linear time trend captures almost 59 percent of the variation in the time series, with a t-statistic of 5.0.
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And 5 Given the five-year lag in making transcripts public, 2009 is the last available year. 6 We obtain similar results if we use different subsets of these terms. For instance, the results are similar if we only count the frequency of the term "financial market". 7 Restricting the sample to the pre-crisis period 1985-2006, we obtain an R 2 of 46 percent and a t-statistic of 4.3. So the 6 the fitted value of the series based on this time trend goes up about four-fold over the 25-year sample period. While this analysis is extremely simplistic, it does suggest an increasing emphasis over time by the FOMC on financial-market considerations. If there was in fact such a change in FOMC thinking, the model we develop below is well-suited to drawing out its implications, both for the dynamics of the policy rate, as well as for longer-term yields. 
III. Static Model
We begin by presenting what is effectively a static version of the model, in which the Fed adjusts the funds rate only partially in response to a one-time innovation in its desired target rate.
Later, in Section IV, we extend the model to a fully dynamic setting, in which we can be more explicit about how an innovation to the Fed's target rate gradually makes its way into the funds rate over time. Though it is stylized, the static model highlights the main intuition for why a desire to limit bond-market volatility creates a time-consistency problem for the Fed.
A. Model Setup
We begin by assuming that at any time t, the Fed has a target rate based on its traditional dual- 
where t i  is the infinite-horizon forward rate. Thus, the Fed has the usual concerns about inflation and unemployment, as captured in reduced form by a desire to keep * t i close to t i . However, when 0   , the Fed also cares about the volatility of long-term bond yields, as measured by the squared change in the infinite-horizon forward rate.
For simplicity, we start by assuming that the expectations hypothesis holds, so there is no time-variation in the term premium. This implies that the infinite-horizon forward rate is equal to the expected value of the funds rate that will prevail in the distant future. Because the target rate
follows a random walk, the infinite-horizon forward rate is then given by the market's best estimate of the current target mind, the Fed might believe that a spike in bond-market volatility could damage highly-levered financial intermediaries and interfere with the credit-supply process. With this stipulation in mind, we take as given that  reflects the socially "correct" objective function-in other words, it is exactly the value that a well-intentioned social planner would choose. We then ask whether there is a timeconsistency problem when the Fed tries to optimize this objective function period-by-period, in the absence of a commitment technology.
Second, note that the Fed's target in the first term of (2) is the short-term policy rate, which it directly controls, whereas the bond-market volatility that it worries about in the second term of (2) refers to the variance of long-term market-determined rates. This short-versus-long divergence is crucial for our results on time consistency. To see why, consider two alternative loss functions:
In (2ꞌ), the Fed cares about the volatility of the funds rate, rather than the volatility of the long-term rate. This objective function mechanically produces gradual adjustment of the funds rate, but because there is no forward-looking long rate, there is no issue of the Fed trying to manipulate market expectations and hence no time-consistency problem. In other words, a model of this sort delivers a strong form of gradualism, but the resulting gradualism is entirely optimal from the Fed's perspective. However, by emphasizing only short-rate volatility, this formulation arguably fails to capture the financial-stability goal articulated by Greenspan, namely to "not create discontinuous problems with respect to balance sheets and asset values." We believe that putting the volatility of the long-term rate directly in the objective function, as in (2), does a better job in this regard.
In (2ꞌꞌ), the Fed pursues its dual-mandate objectives not by having a target Second, in many models of the monetary transmission mechanism, including those based on a bank lending channel or a reaching-for-yield effect, the short rate has an independent effect on economic activity. This could help explain why it might make sense for the Fed to target the short rate per se.
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Finally, the assumption that the Fed cares about the volatility of the infinite-horizon forward Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) , and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2015) . A few noteworthy recent papers on reaching for yield and its implications for the pricing of credit risk are Gertler and Karadi (2015) , Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) , and Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez (2013 
where 2 1 0,
is normally distributed noise that is overlaid onto the rate-setting process. 
Thus, the market correctly conjectures the form of the Fed's smoothing rule but, crucially, it does not directly observe the Fed's smoothing parameter k; rather, it has to make a guess  as to the value of this parameter. In a rational-expectations equilibrium, this guess will turn out to be correct, and we will have k   . However-and this is a key piece of intuition-when the Fed decides how much smoothing to do, it takes the market's conjecture  as a fixed parameter and does not impose that k   . The equilibrium concept here is thus of the "signal-jamming" type introduced by Holmstrom (1999) : the Fed, taking the bond market's estimate of  as fixed, tries to fool the market into thinking that * t i has moved by less than it actually has, in an effort to reduce the volatility of longterm rates. In a Nash equilibrium, these attempts to fool the market wind up being fruitless, but the Fed cannot resist the temptation to try.
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B. Equilibrium
We are now ready to solve for the equilibrium in the static model. Suppose that the economy was previously in steady state at time t-1, with
Given the Fed's adjustment rule, the funds rate at time t satisfies:
Based on its conjecture about the Fed's adjustment rule in Eq. (4), the market tries to back out * t i from its observation of t i . Since both shocks t  and t u are normally distributed, the market's expectation is given by:
The less noise there is in the Fed's adjustment rule, the higher is u  and the more the market reacts to the change in the rate t i .
In light of Eqs. (5) and (6) and the random-walk property that
function taking expectations over the realization of the noise can be written as: 12 There is a close analogy to models where corporate managers with private information pump up their reported earnings in an effort to impress the stock market. See, e.g., Stein (1989) .
The Fed then minimizes this loss function by picking the optimal value of k. Again, we emphasize that in doing so, it takes the market's conjectures about its behavior, and hence the parameter  , as fixed. The first-order condition with respect to k then yields:
In rational-expectations equilibrium, the market's conjecture turns out to be correct, so we have . k   Imposing this condition, we have that, in equilibrium, the Fed's adjustment rule satisfies:
It follows immediately from (9) that the Fed follows a partial-adjustment rule in any rational expectations equilibrium:
Proposition 1: In any rational expectations equilibrium, the Fed's adjustment to a change in its target rate is partial: we have 1 k  so long as 0   .
B.1 Equilibrium with No Noise in Rate-Setting Process
To build some intuition for the Fed's behavior, let us begin by considering the simple limiting case in which there is no noise in the rate setting process:
In this case, the market's inference of * t i is simply:
and the Fed's loss function is:
.
When the Fed considers lowering k, it trades off being further away from the optimal * t i against the fact that it believes it can reduce bond market volatility by moving more slowly. In rationalexpectations equilibrium, Eq. (9) reduces to:
First note that when 0   , the only solution to (12) 
Of these, the larger of the two values also represents a stable equilibrium outcome. Thus, as long as  is not too big, the model also admits a non-degenerate equilibrium, with ½ < k < 1, even with 2 0.
u   Within this region, higher values of  lead to lower values of k. In other words, the more intense the Fed's concern with bond-market volatility, the more gradually it adjusts the funds rate.
B.2 Equilibrium Outcomes across the Parameter Space
Now we return to the more general case where Fed's best response crosses the 45-degree line in three places. Of these three crossing points, the two outer ones (at k = 0.07 and 0.69 respectively) correspond to stable equilibria, in the sense that if the market's initial conjecture  takes on an out-of-equilibrium value, the Fed's best response to that conjecture will tend to drive the outcome towards one of these two extreme crossing points.
The existence of multiple equilibria highlights an essential feature of the model: the potential for market beliefs about Fed behavior to become self-validating. If the market conjectures that the Fed will adjust rates only very gradually, then even small changes are heavily freighted with informational content about the Fed's reaction function. Given this strong market sensitivity and its desire not to create too much volatility, the Fed may then choose to move very carefully, even at the cost of accepting a funds rate that is quite distant from its target. Conversely, if the market conjectures that the Fed is more aggressive in its adjustment of rates, it reacts less to any given movement, which frees the Fed up to track the target rate more closely.
When there are multiple equilibria, it is typically the case that the one with the higher value of k leads to a better outcome from the perspective of the Fed's objective function: with a higher k, t i is closer to * t i , and yet in equilibrium, bond-market volatility is no greater. This suggests that if we are in a range of the parameter space where multiple equilibria are a possibility, it is important for the Fed to avoid doing anything in its communications that tends to lead the market to conjecture a low value of κ. Even keeping its own preferences fixed, fostering an impression of strong gradualism among market participants can lead to an undesirable outcome in which the Fed gets stuck in the lowk equilibrium. We will return to this point in more detail shortly, when we discuss the implications of forward guidance in our model. As noted earlier, the very small but non-zero value of 2 u  plays an important role in pinning down the "low-k" equilibria illustrated in Panels (b) and (c)-those where we have k < 0.5. If instead we were to set 2 u  = 0, these equilibria would degenerate to k = 0, for the reasons described above. / u    to 25 instead of 250. This leads to an increase in the (unique) equilibrium value of k from 0.04 to 0.35. Intuitively, with more noise in the rate-setting process, the market reacts less sensitively to a given change in rates, which allows the Fed to adjust rates more elastically in response to changes in its target.
C. The Time-Consistency Problem
A central property of our model is that there is a time-consistency problem: the Fed would do better in terms of optimizing its own objective function if it were able to commit to behaving as if it had a lower value of  than it actually does. This is because while the Fed is always tempted to move the funds rate gradually so as to reduce bond-market volatility, this desire is frustrated in equilibrium: the more gradually the Fed acts, the more the market responds to any given change in rates. Thus, all that is left is a funds rate that is further from target on average. This point comes through most transparently if we consider the limiting case in which there is no noise in the Fed's rate-setting process. In this case, once we impose the rational-expectations assumption that k   , the Fed's attempts at smoothing have no effect at all on bond-market volatility in equilibrium:
Thus, the value of the Fed's loss function is
which is decreasing in k for 1. k  To the extent that the target rate * t i is non-verifiable private information, it is hard to think of a contracting technology that can readily implement the first-best outcome under commitment: how does one write an enforceable rule that says that the Fed must always react fully to its private information? Thus, discretionary monetary policy will inevitably be associated with some degree of inefficiency. However, even in the absence of a binding commitment technology, there may still be scope for improving on the fully discretionary outcome. One possible approach follows in the spirit of Rogoff (1985) , who argues that society should appoint a central banker who is more hawkish on inflation than is society itself. The analogy in the current context is that society should aim to appoint a central banker who cares less about financial-market volatility (i.e., has a lower value of  ) than society as a whole. Or put differently, society-and the central bank itself-should seek to foster an institutional culture and set of norms that discourages the monetary policy committee from being overly attentive to market-volatility considerations.  to minimize its ex ante loss, recognizing that its own concern about financial-market volatility is given by  : The time-consistency problem is especially stark in our setting because the Fed is assumed to care about the volatility of the infinite-horizon rate. As can be seen in (14), this volatility is a fixed constant in any rational-expectations equilibrium, independent of the degree of gradualism. Thus, the Fed's efforts to control the volatility of the infinite-horizon rate are completely unsuccessful in equilibrium, which is why it is ex ante optimal to appoint a central banker who does not care at all about this infinite-horizon volatility. By contrast, if we instead assume that the Fed cares about the volatility of a finite-horizon rate (e.g., the 10-year rate), there is still a time-consistency problem, but it is attenuated. If the expectations hypothesis holds, then the finite-horizon rate is given by the expected path of the funds rate over that finite horizon. By moving gradually, the Fed can actually reduce the volatility of the realized path. However, it still cannot fool the market about its ultimate destination. 13 In the alternative case where rate-setting noise is small but non-zero, a mild generalization of Proposition 2 obtains. While it is no longer true that the Fed would like to commit to behaving as if θ was exactly equal to zero, it would still like to commit to behaving as if θ was very close to zero and much smaller than its actual value. For example, for the parameter values in Panel D of Fig. 2 , where the Fed's actual θ = 0.4, it would minimize its loss function if it were able to commit to θ = 0.04. In the appendix, we provide a fuller treatment of the optimal solution under commitment in the case of non-zero noise.
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One way to develop this intuition in our setting is to note that any finite-horizon rate can be approximated by a weighted average of the current funds rate t i and the infinite-horizon forward rate
, as long as we pick the weights correctly. This follows from the fact that there is only one factor, namely t  , in our model of the term structure of interest rates. Using this observation, it is straightforward to establish the following proposition, which is proven in the appendix. Under discretion, the Fed has two motives when it moves gradually. First, it aims to reduce the volatility of the component of the finite-horizon rate that is related to the current short rate t i .
Second, it hopes to reduce the volatility of the component of the finite-horizon rate that is related to the infinite-horizon forward rate t i  by fooling the market about its private information t  . The first goal can be successfully attained in rational-expectations equilibrium, but the second cannot-as in the baseline model, the Fed cannot fool the market about its private information in equilibrium.
Under commitment, only one of these motives for moving gradually remains, and thus it is less appealing to move gradually than it would be under discretion. Thus, if society is appointing a central banker whose concern about financial market volatility is given by c 
D. Does Forward Guidance Help or Hurt?
Because the Fed's target rate * t i is non-verifiable private information, it is impossible to write a contract that effectively commits the Fed to rapid adjustment of the funds rate in the direction of
So to the extent that the problem has not already been solved by appointing a central banker with the appropriate disregard for bond-market volatility, the first-best is generally unattainable. But this raises the question of whether there are other more easily enforced contracts that might be of some help in addressing the time-consistency problem. In this section, we ask whether something along the lines of forward guidance could fill this role. By "forward guidance", we mean an arrangement whereby the Fed announces at time t a value of the funds rate that it expects to prevail at some point in the future. Since both the announcement itself and the future realization of the funds rate are both publicly observable, market participants can easily tell ex post whether the Fed has honored its guidance, and one might imagine that it will suffer a reputational penalty if it fails to do so. In this sense, a "guidance contract" is more enforceable than a "don't-smooth-with-respect-to-privateinformation contract."
It is well understood that a semi-binding commitment to adhere to a pre-announced path for the short rate can be of value when the short rate is at the zero lower bound (ZLB); see e.g., Krugman
(1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , and Woodford (2012). We do not take issue with this observation here. Rather, we ask a different question, namely whether guidance can also be useful away from the ZLB, as a device for addressing the central bank's tendency to adjust rates too gradually. It turns out the answer is no. Forward guidance can never help with the time-consistency problem we have identified, and attempts to use guidance away from the ZLB can potentially make matters strictly worse.
We develop the argument in two steps, working backwards. First, we assume that it is time t, and the Fed comes into the period having already announced a specific future rate path at time t-1.
We then ask how the existence of this guidance influences the smoothing incentives analyzed above.
Having done so, we then fold back to time t-1 and ask what the optimal guidance announcement looks like and whether the existence of the guidance technology increases or decreases the Fed's expected utility from an ex ante perspective.
To be more precise, suppose we are in steady state at time t-1, and suppose again that the Fed cares about the volatility of the infinite horizon forward rate. We allow the Fed to publicly announce a value 1 f t i  as its guidance regarding t i , the funds rate that will prevail one period later, at time t. To make the guidance partially credible, we assume that once it has been announced, the Fed bears a reputational cost of deviating from the guidance so that its augmented loss function at time t is now given by:
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When it arrives at time t, the Fed takes the reputational penalty  as exogenously fixed, but when we fold back to analyze guidance from an ex-ante perspective, it is more natural to think of  as a choice variable for the Fed at time t-1. That is, the more emphatically it talks about its guidance ex ante or the more reputational chips it puts on the table, the greater will be the penalty if it deviates from the guidance ex post.
We start at time t and take the forward guidance 1 f t i  as given. To keep things simple, we assume that there is no noise in the Fed's adjustment rule ( 2 u  = 0). Recall from Eq. (13) above that, in this case, there only exists a stable non-degenerate (i.e. positive k) equilibrium when  < ¼, a condition that we assume to be satisfied in what follows. Moreover, in such an equilibrium, we have
Given the more complicated nature of the Fed's objective function, its optimal choice as to how much to adjust the short rate no longer depends on just its private information t  ; it also depends on the previously-established forward guidance 1 f t i  . To allow for a general treatment, we posit that this adjustment can be described by some potentially non-linear function of the two variables:
Moreover, the market conjectures that the Fed is following a potentially non-linear rule:
As before, given its conjecture about the Fed's adjustment rule, the market tries to back out ; ; ; ; .
The Fed minimizes this loss function by choosing over the set of possible functions   ; f   , taking as fixed the market's conjecture about its behavior ( ; )    . In the appendix, we use a calculus-of-variations type of argument to establish that, in a rational-expectations equilibrium in which   ; (;) f       , the Fed's adjustment behavior is given by:
where the partial-adjustment coefficient k now satisfies: anything that encourages the time-t rate to hew closely to the t-1 guidance must also discourage the incorporation of t  into the time-t rate. This is the key insight for why guidance is not helpful away from the ZLB.
To make this point more formally, let us now fold back to time t-1 and ask two questions.
First, assuming that 0 
 
The first part of the proposition reflects the fact that because the Fed is already at its target at time t-1 and has no information about how that target will further evolve at time t, the best it can do is to set 1 f t i  at its current value of 1 t i  . This guidance carries no incremental information to market participants at t-1. Nevertheless, even though it is uninformative, the guidance has an effect on ratesetting at time t. As Eq. (23) highlights, a desire to not renege on its guidance leads the Fed to underreact by more to its new time-t private information. Since this is strictly undesirable, the Fed is better off not putting guidance in place to begin with.
This negative result about the value of forward guidance in Proposition 4 should be qualified in two ways. First, as we have already emphasized, this result only speaks to the desirability of guidance away from the ZLB; there is nothing here that contradicts Krugman (1998) , Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , and Woodford (2012), who make the case for using a relatively strong form of guidance (i.e., with a significantly positive value of  ) when the economy is stuck at the ZLB.
Second, and more subtly, an advocate of using forward guidance away from the ZLB might argue that if it is done with a light touch, it can help to communicate the Fed's private information to the market, without reducing the Fed's future room to maneuver. In particular, if the Fed is careful to make it clear that its guidance embodies no attempt at a binding commitment whatsoever (i.e., that  = 0), the guidance may serve as a purely informational device and cannot hurt.
The idea that guidance can play a useful informational role strikes us as perfectly reasonable, even though it does not emerge in our model. The Fed's private information here is unidimensional, and because it is already fully revealed in equilibrium, there is no further information for guidance to transmit. However, it is quite plausible that, in a richer model, things would be different, and guidance could be incrementally informative. On the other hand, our model also suggests that care should be taken when claiming that light-touch ( = 0) guidance has no negative effects in terms of increasing the equilibrium degree of gradualism in the funds rate.
This point is most easily seen by considering the region of the parameter space where there are multiple equilibria. In this region, anything that influences market beliefs can have self-fulfilling effects. So, for example, suppose that the Fed puts in place a policy of purely informational forward guidance, and FOMC members unanimously agree that the guidance does not in any way represent a commitment on their parts-that is, they all plan to behave as if 0   and indeed manage to follow through on this plan ex post. Nevertheless, if some market participants think that guidance comes with a degree of commitment (γ > 0), there can still be a problem. These market participants expect smaller deviations from the announced path of rates, and if we are in the multiple-equilibrium region, this expectation can be self-validating. Thus, the mistaken belief that guidance entails commitment can lead to an undesirable outcome where the Fed winds up moving more gradually in equilibrium, thereby lowering its utility. Again, this effect arises even if all FOMC members actually behave as if 0   and attach no weight to keeping rates in line with previously-issued guidance. Thus, at least in the narrow context of our model, there would appear to be some potential downside associated with even the mildest forms of forward guidance once the economy is away from the ZLB.
E. Term Premium Shocks
We next enrich the model in another direction, to consider how the Fed behaves when financial-market conditions are not purely a function of the expected path of interest rates.
Specifically, we relax the assumption that the expectations hypothesis holds and assume that the infinite-horizon forward rate consists of both the expected future short rate and an exogenous term premium component t r :
The term premium is assumed to be common information, observed simultaneously by market participants and the Fed. We allow the term premium to follow an arbitrary process and let t  denote the innovation in the term premium:
The solution method in this case is similar to that used for forward guidance in Section III.D.
Specifically, we again assume that there is no noise in the Fed's rate-setting rule ( 2 u  = 0) but that the rule can be an arbitrary non-linear function of both the new private information t  that the Fed learns at time t as well as the term premium shock t  , which is publicly observable:
The market again conjectures that the Fed is following a non-linear rule:
As before, given its conjecture about the Fed's adjustment rule, the market tries to back out 
In the appendix, we show that the solution to (29) 
The following proposition summarizes the key properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 5: The Fed acts to offset term premium shocks, lowering the funds rate when the term premium shock is positive and raising it when the term premium shock is negative. It does so even though term premium shocks are publically observable and in spite of the fact that its efforts to reduce the volatility associated with term premium shocks are fruitless in equilibrium. As the Fed's concern with bond-market volatility  increases, k  falls and k  increases in absolute magnitude. Thus, when it cares more about the bond market, the Fed reacts more gradually to changes in its private information about its target rate, but more aggressively to changes in term premiums.
A first observation about the equilibrium is that the Fed's response to its own private information, k  , is exactly the same as it was in the absence of term premium shocks (assuming no rate-setting noise) as derived in Section III.B.1. One might then be tempted to think that nothing 25 changes when we introduce term premium shocks, because they are publicly observable. Proposition 5 shows that, strikingly, this is not the case. Short rates do in fact respond to movements in the term premium.
What explains this result? Essentially, when the term premium spikes up, the Fed is unhappy about the prospective increase in the volatility of long rates. So even if its private information about * t i has in fact not changed, it would like to make the market think it has become more dovish so as to offset the rise in the term premium. Therefore, it cuts the short rate in an effort to create this impression. Again, in equilibrium, this attempt to fool the market is not successful, but taking the market's conjectures at any point in time as fixed, the Fed is always tempted to try.
One way to see why the equilibrium must involve the Fed reacting to term premium shocks is
to think about what happens if we try to sustain an equilibrium where it does not-that is, if we try to sustain an equilibrium in which 0 k   . In such a hypothetical equilibrium, Eq. (30) tells us that when the market sees any movement in the funds rate, it attributes that movement entirely to changes in the Fed's private information t  about its target rate. But if this is the case, then the Fed can indeed offset movements in term premiums by changing the short rate, thereby contradicting the assumption that 0 k   . Hence, 0 k   cannot be an equilibrium.
A second key feature of the equilibrium is that the absolute magnitude of k  becomes larger as  rises and as k  becomes smaller: when it cares more about bond-market volatility, the Fed's responsiveness to term premium shocks becomes more aggressive even as its adjustment to new private information becomes more gradual. In particular, because we are restricting ourselves to the region of the parameter space where the simple no-noise model yields a non-degenerate equilibrium for k  , this means that we must have 0 <  < ¼ from Eq. (13) above. As  moves from the lower to the upper end of this range, k  declines monotonically from 1 to ½, and k  increases in absolute magnitude from 0 to -½. This latter part of the proposition is especially useful, as it yields a sharp testable empirical implication. As noted earlier, Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2015) have shown that the Fed's behavior has become significantly more inertial in recent years. If we think of this change as reflecting a lower value of k  , we might be tempted to use the logic of the model to claim that the 26 lower k  is the result of the Fed placing increasing weight over time on the bond market, i.e. having a higher value of  than it used to. While the evidence on financial-market mentions in the FOMC transcripts that we plotted in Figure 1 is loosely consistent with this hypothesis, it is obviously far from being a decisive test. However with Proposition 4 in hand, if we want to attribute a decline in k  to an increase in  , then we also have to confront the additional prediction that we ought to observe the Fed responding more forcefully over time to term premium shocks. That is, the absolute value of k  must have gone up. If this is not the case, it would represent a rejection of the hypothesis.
Our earlier results about the value of commitment generalize straightforwardly to the case where there are term premium shocks. Consider, as before, the problem of a social planner appointing a central banker whose concern about financial market volatility is given by c  . This central banker will implement the adjustment rules characterized by   
As can be seen from (32) As before, in the rational-expectations equilibrium with term premium shocks, the Fed cannot influence the volatility of the infinite horizon-forward rate. If it attempts to do so, it realizes no benefit and just ends up with a funds rate that is further from target on average. Thus it is again optimal to commit to not trying to manage volatility by setting c  = 0.
IV. Dynamic Model
In the static model considered to this point, the phenomenon of "gradualism" is really nothing more than under-adjustment of the policy rate to a one-time shock to the Fed's target. We now introduce a dynamic version of the model, which allows us to fully trace out how a shock to the Fed's target works its way into the policy rate over time. This dynamic analysis generates predictions that can be more directly compared to the empirical evidence on gradualism.
A. The Fed's Adjustment Rule
To study dynamics, we need to consider the Fed's behavior when the economy is not in steady state at time t-1. Suppose we enter period t with a pre-existing gap between the time t-1 target rate and the time t-1 federal funds rate of
We allow the Fed to have a more general adjustment rule of the following form:
In other words, we allow the Fed to adjust differentially to the pre-existing gap 1 t X  and to the innovation to its target t  .
B. The Case of Fully Rational Investors
The first case to consider is one in which-as in the static model above-all investors are fully rational. To begin, note that if there is no rate-setting noise .
Given this conjecture, the rational investor's estimate of the innovation to the Fed's target t  , and hence his estimate of the innovation to the short rate that will prevail in the distant future, is given by:
This is similar to what we had in Eq. (10) would appear to be strongly counterfactual.
14 As we discuss further in the appendix, to simplify the problem, we also assume that at any time t, the Fed picks k  and X k taking 1 t X  as given, but before knowing the realization of t  . This timing convention is purely a technical trick that makes the problem more tractable without changing anything of economic substance.
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C. Allowing for Some Naïve Investors
One way to bring the model more closely into alignment with the empirical evidence is to allow for a class of investors with a modest form of bounded rationality. To motivate the presence of these "naïve" investors, note that the updating performed by the fully rational investors, as described by Eq. (35) 
Thus, naïve investors act as though the change in the Fed's target, and hence the change in the short rate that will prevail in the distant future, has a simple univariate relationship with the change in the short rate t i  :
where  is a fixed constant. The beliefs of the naïve investors are similar to those of the rational investors in the static version of the model, as described in Eq. (10): they treat the current change in the short rate as a sufficient statistic for the expected change in the Fed's target. However, unlike the rational investors in the dynamic version, whose beliefs are given by (35), the naïve investors fail to adjust for
We assume that a fraction λ of investors are rational, and the remaining fraction (1 -λ) are naïve, so that the change in the market-determined infinite-horizon forward rate is the weighted average of the change in their respective expectations for the short rate that will prevail in the distant future:
As before, the equilibrium involves the Fed picking X k and k  to minimize its loss function holding fixed the behavior of naïve investors (  ) and the conjectures X  and   of rational investors. In the rational expectations equilibrium, the conjectures of the rational investors will be validated so we
We further assume that naïve investors' estimate of  is optimal, given the Fed's equilibrium behavior and given their own failure to condition on 1 t X  . In particular, we assume that  is pinned down as the regression coefficient of t  on the change in the short rate t i  :
Hence our naïve investors are actually quite smart, apart from their mistake of ignoring 1 .
t X 
However, it should be noted that our qualitative results below do not depend on the way the regression coefficient  is chosen-they emerge even if it is not chosen optimally.
With these assumptions in place, we are able to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 8: In the dynamic model with both fully rational and naïve investors, we have 1
As the fraction of naïve investors (1 )   increases, X k declines and approaches k  .
The basic intuition behind the proposition is simple. Naïve investors indiscriminately treat any change in the funds rate-whether it is driven by t  or by 1 t X  -as informative about changes in future expected short rates, and hence as relevant for pricing long-maturity bonds. Thus, the Fed is now motivated to move gradually in incorporating both t  and 1 t X  into the current funds rate. In other words, in its efforts to manage market expectations, the Fed is driven to partially cater to the beliefs of the naïve investors. Since these investors do not discriminate between t  and 1 t X  , there is a tendency for the Fed to treat these two variables similarly as well, that is, to push X k closer to k  .
This effect gets us away from the empirically unrealistic implication that 1
Example 1: Suppose we have θ = 0.9, and λ = 0.1. This leads to 0.260 k   and to 0.309. 
X k 
The two examples illustrate the sorts of outcomes that obtain in the dynamic model with naïve investors. The first example is one in which the market is largely dominated by naïve investors, and the Fed has a relatively high value of θ, so it cares strongly about bond-market volatility. In this case, adjustment of the funds rate to both components t  and 1 t X  is quite slow and very similar in magnitude. Thus, this example comes close to replicating the dynamic behavior of the funds rate that has been documented in the data. In the second example, the market is evenly balanced between rational and naïve investors, and θ is much lower. As might be expected, there is less gradualism overall, and there is a more noticeable difference between the speed with which the Fed impounds new ( k  ) versus old ( X k ) innovations to its target into the funds rate. Nevertheless, both examples yield values of X k that are well below unity, i.e., that differ substantially from the all-rational case.
Note that the time-consistency problem persists here. As we have set things up, both the rational and the naïve investors contribute to the time-consistency problem, because both have equilibrium beliefs that are endogenous to Fed behavior-that is, both react more strongly to a given change in the funds rate when the Fed moves more gradually. For the naïve investors, this feature is captured in the expression for  in Eq. (39). If we were instead to make the cruder assumption that  is a fixed constant independent of equilibrium Fed behavior, then the time-consistency problem would be driven entirely by the presence of the rational investors.
In sum, a dynamic version of our model seems capable of generating empirically realistic inertial behavior for the funds rate. However, doing so requires augmenting our basic privateinformation framework to include some boundedly rational investors. Specifically, we need some investors who recognize that movements in today's funds rate are informative about future values of the funds rate, but who are not so sophisticated that their mapping between the two incorporates a time-varying estimate of the current gap between the Fed's target and the prevailing funds rate.
V. Conclusion
Rather than restating our findings, we conclude with a brief caveat. We have argued that in our setting, it can be valuable for a central bank to develop an institutional culture and set of norms such that a concern with bond-market volatility does not play an outsized role in policy deliberations.
In other words, it can be useful for monetary policymakers to build a reputation for not caring too much about the bond market. This argument rests on a comparison of equilibrium outcomes with different values of the parameter c  , which measures the appointed central banker's concern about financial-market volatility. But crucially, an implicit assumption in making this comparison is that in any given equilibrium, the market has come to fully know the true value of c  . We have not addressed the more difficult question of out-of-equilibrium dynamics: how is it that the market learns about c  , from the central bank's observed behavior and other forms of communication?
For this reason, our model offers no guidance on the best way to make the transition to a less bond-market-sensitive equilibrium, one in which there is less inertia in the policy rate, and the market eventually comes to understand that c  has declined. At any point in time, taking market conjectures as fixed, a "cold turkey" approach that involves an unexpectedly sharp adjustment in the path of the policy rate (relative to prevailing expectations of gradualism) is likely to cause significant market volatility and perhaps some collateral costs for the real economy. To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be taken as advocating such an approach. In particular, we do not believe our model has much advice to give with respect to the near-term question of how rapidly the Fed should lift rates in the months following its liftoff from the zero lower bound. At this horizon, market conjectures regarding the equilibrium degree of gradualism are likely to be relatively fixed, and the costs of changing behavior suddenly could potentially be quite high. To the extent that an institution-building effort of the sort we have in mind is at all useful, it may be something that is better undertaken over a longer horizon or at a time when the economy is in a less fragile state.
which is minimized by setting c = 0 so that k ( c ) = 1.
In the presence of noise, the appointed central banker will implement the rational-expectations equilibrium k ( c ) given by Equation (9) in the main text replacing with c . Di¤erentiating k ( c ) with respect to c yields
In the presence of noise, society's ex ante loss function is given by
Substituting in for the rational-expectations de…nition of and di¤erentiating with respect to c gives the …rst order condition
At the optimum c in the presence of noise, the term in square brackets will be zero. When we discuss the optimal c in the presence of noise in footnote 13 of the main text, we numerically solve for the value of c and therefore k that sets the term in square brackets to zero.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by characterizing the behavior of an appointed central banker who care about a …nite-horizon yield, which can be represented as a weighted average of the short rate and the in…nite-horizon rate: i f inite t = i t + (1 ) i 1 t : The degree of concern about the volatility of the …nite-horizon yield is parameterized by c . The central banker follows a rule of the form i t = i t 1 + k ( c ) " t ; while the market conjectures that the central banker is following a rule of the form i t = i t 1 + ( c ) " t :
Given this, the market's conjecture about " t is e " t = k " t and it sets the in…nite-horizon forward rate to i which in expectation at t 1 is equal to
This is minimized by setting i f t 1 = i t 1 . Finally we solve for the optimal . Di¤erentiating (A.2) with respect to , we have @k @ = k 2 2k (1 + ) 1 < 0 so long as k > 1=2, which it will be in the parameter space we study. Setting i f t 1 = i t 1 and di¤erentiating the ex ante loss function (A.3) with respect to yields 2 (1 k) @k @ + k 2 1 2k 2k (1 + ) 1 2 " > 0 since @k=@ < 0 and k > 1=2: Since the ex ante loss is increasing in , it is optimal to set = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Given its conjecture about the rule the Fed is following, (" t ; t ), the market's conjecture about " t is e " t = 1 (f (" t ; t ) ; t ) and the Fed's loss function is (" t f (" t ; t )) 2 + 1 (f (" t ; t ) ; t ) + t 2 :
Consider the e¤ect on the value of the loss function of a small perturbation in the value of f (" t ; t ), df . The e¤ect of this perturbation is zero at the optimal f ( ; ) so we have (" t f (" t ; t )) + 1 (f (" t ; t ) ; t ) + t @ 1 @i j i=f ("t; t ) = 0: (A.4) Since 1 (x) = x, we have @ 1 @i j i=f ("t; t ) = 1 @ @i j "= 1 (f ("t; t ); t )
:
Substituting into (A.4) gives (" t f (" t ; t )) + 1 (f (" t ; t ) ; t ) + t 1 @ @i j "= 1 (f ("t; t ); t ) = 0:
Imposing rational expectations, we have = f so that this reduces to the di¤erential equation @f @" j "="t (" t f (" t ; t )) = (" t + t ) ; which the optimal f ( ; ) must satisfy.
Di¤erentiating with respect to k X yields
Imposing rational expectations we have k X = X which implies that k X = 1. Di¤erentiating with respect to k " yields 0 = (1 k " ) + k "
2 "
Imposing rational expectations we have k " = " which implies that
k 2 " + as before.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Now the market is composed of two types investors. Fraction of investors is rational and makes the same inference about " t as before
Fraction 1 is naive. They ignore X t 1 and assume the Fed is following a rule of the form
Given this conjecture and i t , they back out
The overall change in the in…nite-horizon forward rate is
The central banker picks k X and k " to minimize the loss function
Di¤erentiating with respect to k X and imposing rational expectations for the rational investors (k X = X ), we have
: (A.6)
Note that when = 1, this implies k X = 1 as before: For < 1, we have k X < 1 if > 0. When = 0, we have
Di¤erentiating with respect to k " and imposing rational expectations for the rational investors (k " = " ), we have
If = 1 , this reduces to
k 2 " + as before. If = 0 it reduces to k " = 1 1 + 2 = k X :
Note that we have k X k " if
This is reduces to
which is always true, so it is the case that k X k " :
The equilibrium relationship between " t and change in the short rate is given by
Since X t = (1 k X ) X t 1 + (1 k " ) " t , the unconditional variance of X is given by
so we can write
Given and , the equilibrium we study satis…es (A.6), (A.7), and = b . Finally, we show that the time consistency problem persists in this setting. As before, suppose that society's true concern with bond market volatility is given by , but that it appoints a central banker whose concern is given by c . Recognizing rational investors' correct expectations in equilibrium, the Fed's utility is
Di¤erentiating with respect to c yields h
The …rst order conditions under discretion imply that
(1 ) k X k " = (1 k X ) + (1 ) 2 2 k X and 0 = (1 k " ) + c k " + (1 )
So we can rewrite the derivative with respect to c as
Since @k X =@ c < 0 and @k " =@ c < 0, this is unambiguously positive so the Fed is better o¤ with a lower c .
